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ARTICLE 
BEYOND THE NATION STATE: 
NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT 
AND "NATIONAL INTEREST" IN 
MEKONG HYDROPOWER 
DEVELOPMENT 
By PHILIP HIRSCH-
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1995 Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin provided the frame-
work for establishing the Mekong River Commission, and re-
flected a renewed interest in development of the riverine and 
other natural resources of mainland Southeast Asia. 1 In part 
this interest and dialogue reflected an easing of geopolitical 
tensions, which had hitherto restricted both cooperation be-
tween, and economic development within, the riparian states of 
the Mekong River. 2 In part, however, the Agreement, and the 
revival of the cooperative framework between the four lower 
• . Philip Hirsch is a professor of Geology at the University of Sydney in Australia 
and editor of SEEING FORESTS FOR TREES: ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN 
THAILAND AND POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: RESOURCES AND 
RESISTANCE (1997) and co·editor of THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST 
AS1A: RESOURCES AND RESISTANCE (Philip Hirsch & Carol Warren eds., 1998). 
1. Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin, April 5, 1995, 34I.L.M. 864 [hereafter MRC 1995}. 
2. See Philip Hirsch, Thailand and the New Geopolitics of Southeast Asia: Resource 
and Environmental Issues, in COUNTING THE COSTS: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EN. 
VIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THAILAND 235, 235·259 (Jonathan Rigg ed., 1997). 
399 
1
Hirsch: Development of the Mekong
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
400 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:399 
riparian states, heralded a new set of emerging conflicts. 3 
These conflicts are particularly apparent in the area of pro-
posed hydropower development on the Mekong and its tribu-
taries, due to the environmental and social concerns that have 
arisen over large dams worldwide. 4 
In this article, I examine environmental, social and legal is-
sues associated with Mekong hydropower development in three 
main arenas. Each of these arenas takes discussion beyond the 
nation state, and in so doing I argue that the framework for the 
Mekong River Commission, which is designed to balance inter-
ests of riparian states, is quite limited. The first sense in 
which decision making in Mekong development goes beyond 
the nation state is the most obvious, in that the international 
nature of the river, which flows through six countries, raises 
transboundary issues of water sharing, fIsheries management 
and other resource and environmental management questions. 
The second sense in which influence is exerted beyond the na-
tion state is that the Mekong Region has become subject to 
multifarious international influences, mostly in the name of 
development (in place of Cold War geopolitical and military 
intervention), both by governmental and corporate interests 
from countries that have largely ceased large-scale hydropower 
development within their own territories. The third way in 
which this article transcends the nation state as a framework 
for decision making is by suggesting that the divergent inter-
ests in many aspects of Mekong development are not primarily 
those of one country versus another. Rather, there are diver-
gent social, economic and ideological interests within countries, 
and convergent interests that transcend national borders. The 
nation state is thus only partly able to represent its citizens' 
interests and aspirations, but the term "national interest" is 
nevertheless still applied forcefully in promoting many of the 
larger and more controversial schemes. 
3. See PHILIP HIRSCH & GERARD CHEONG, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN 
THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN: PERSPECTIVES FOR AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT COOP· 
ERATION: FINAL OVERVIEW REPORT TO AUsAID (March 1996). 
4. See EDWARD GoLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1984); PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: 
THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (1996). 
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RENEWED INTER-
EST IN "DEVELOPING" THE MEKONG 
The Mekong River is the world's twelfth longest river. 5 It is 
the tenth largest river in terms of annual water yield and the 
third most biodiverse in terms of ichtyofaWlal species. 6 The 
Mekong is also one of the world's most seasonal large rivers, 
with the wettest monthly flows in the lower Mekong River 
some fifteen times the driest monthly flows in an average year. 7 
This latter fact has encouraged river basin planners to seek 
ways to regulate the river flow through construction of large 
dams. However, to date the Mekong and its tributaries remain 
relatively unregulated. Nevertheless, there is now consider-
able pressure for large-scale hydropower development. 8 This 
pressure is in contrast to the situation in many other parts of 
the world, notably in North America and Australia, where the 
era of large dam construction is over. In the United States 
there is now a possibility that dams on the Snake River will be 
dismantled, and in Australia there has been discussion of re-
storing Lake Pedder in Tasmania, which was inWldated by a 
dam on the Gordon River.9 Other restorations being negotiated 
in Australia include release of water diverted from the east-
ward flowing Snowy River to feed irrigation schemes west of 
the Great Divide in the Murray Darling Basin. 10 
The Mekong River Basin is home to about 60 million people, 
most of whom live in rural areas. 11 Numerous ethnic minorities 
5. See CARMEN REVENGA ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE AND 
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, WATERSHEDS OF THE WORLD: ECOLOGICAL VALUE AND 
VULNERABILITY (1998). 
6. See Tyson Roberts, Mekong Mainstream Hydropower Dams: Run of the River 
or Ruin of the River, 43 NAT. HIST. BULL. OF THE SIAM SOCY 9 (1995); Singkham Phon-
visay, Policy Framework for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Sub-Sector in Lao PDR, 
Remarks at the Workshop on Aquatic Research and Establishment of the National 
Aquatic Research Institute in Lao PDR (March 19-21, 1997). 
7. See MEKONG RIVER COMM'N, LOWER MEKONG HYDROLOGIC YEARBOOK 1992 
(1996). 
8. See DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS IN THE MEKONG SUBREGION (Robert Stensholt 
ed., 1996); DEVELOPING THE MEKONG SUBREGION (Robert Stensholt ed., 1996). 
9. See ROGER GREEN, BATTLE FOR THE FRANKLIN (1981). 
10. See Murray Hogarth, Snowy River Rivals Fight over Flows (June 27, 1998) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/9806127 ltextlnationaI12.html:>. 
11. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
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inhabit upland areas of southern China, Lao PDR, northern 
Thailand, northeastern Cambodia and the Central Highlands 
of Vietnam.12 Hydropower development directly affects these 
minorities due to resettlement of communities in inundation 
zones, but it also indirectly affects remoter highland communi-
ties by making them targets of resettlement programs by gov-
ernments that are keen to protect the catchments of large res-
ervoirs and which see indigenous minorities as a threat. There 
is thus a close inter-twining of human rights and environ-
mental issues· associated with proposed hydropower develop-
ment. 
Plans for large-scale dam construction on the Mekong and 
its tributaries date from the 1960s.13 Following the establish-
ment of the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of 
the Lower Mekong Basin in 1957, the US Board of Reclamation 
carried out a number of studies of potential impoundment sites 
on the Mekong mainstream.14 In 1970s, a grand master plan 
for the mainstream was produced in the form of a "Mekong 
Cascade," which would have left little free-flowing water be-
tween the point at which the Mekong forms the border between 
Laos and Burma, and the upper end of the Delta in central 
Cambodia. 15 The lynchpin project for this scheme was the Pa 
Mong Dam, which in its original formulation would have 
flooded the provincial towns of Loei in Thailand and Vangviang 
in Laos and would have displaced a total of a quarter of a mil-
lion people. 16 
At the time that the original plans for the Mekong were be-
ing drawn up, the region was in turmoil. The four Lower Me-
kong countries (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam) 
12. See ETHNIC GROUPS ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES IN MAINLANI> SOUTHEAST 
ASIA (Gehan Wijeyewardene ed., 1990). 
13. See JEFFERY W. JACOBS, INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
CLIMATIC CHANGE: THE LoWER MEKONG OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1992). 
14. See INTERIM COMM. FOR COOROINATION OF INVESTIGATIONS OIl THE LoWER 
MEKONG BASIN, PERSPECTIVES FOR MEKONG DEVELOPMENT (1987). 
15. See MEKONG COMM., INDICATIVE BASIN PLAN (1970). 
16. See Michael Mitchell, Scale and Influence in Mekong Basin Development 
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney) (on file with author). 
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were all United States allies l7 and the Mekong Committee was 
heavily influenced by U.S. geopolitical strategy in the region. 
Large areas of territory in each of these countries were outside 
the effective control of the national governments concerned and 
were subject to bombardment by U.S. aircraft. During this pe-
riod of conflict, most of the plans remained on paper. 18 Only 
one major hydropower project was constructed under the aus-
pices of the Mekong Committee, the N am Ngum Dam in Laos. 
Although this was a tributary project entirely contained within 
one riparian country, it is international both in the funding it 
received (from 10 countries including a loan of cement from 
Thailand) and in that most of the power generated has been for 
export to Thailand. 19 The dam still makes a major contribution 
to Laos' foreign exchange earnings.2O 
Following the Communist victories in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam in 1975, the Mekong became an axis of division be-
tween Cold War foes on the global and regional stages. The 
Mekong Committee went into abeyance for three years as the 
Pol Pot regime in Cambodia pulled that country out of the 
framework for cooperation.21 In 1978 an Interim Committee 
was established, but during the following decade little was ac-
complished as tensions remained after the Vietnamese occupa-
tion of Cambodia.22 However, by 1987 a Revised Indicative 
Plan was produced.23 The basis for this plan was quite similar 
17. Cambodia was neutral until 1970, when a U.S. inspired coup d'etat displaced 
Sihanouk in favour of General Lon No1. See MICHAEL VICKERY, KAMPUCHEA: POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY (1986). 
18. A National Geographic feature at this time was titled, The Mekong: River of 
Terror and Hope. The terror in question was the war. The hope was the prospect of a 
system of large dams, most notably Pa Mong. The Mekong: River of Terror and Hope, 
134 NAT. GEOGRAPHIC 737 (December 1968). 
19. See Kaneungnit Tubtim et aI., Decentralization, Watersheds, and Ethnicity in 
Laos, in RESOURCES, NATIONS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CASE STUDIES FROM 
AUSTRALIA, MELANESIA AND SOUTHEAST AsIA 265 (1996). 
20. See id. 
21. See Bui Kim Chi, The Mekong Region: the Historical, Political and Economic 
Context for the Development of the Water Resources of the Mekong River (1997) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne) (on file with author). 
22. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
23. See MEKONG COMM., REVISED INDICATIVE PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LAND, WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES OF THE LOWER MEKONG BASIN (1987). 
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to the original Mekong Cascade scheme, but with a scaled 
down version of Pa Mong. 
From the late 1980s, there was a rapid regional rapproche-
ment, which took a number of forms. Liberalisation of the so-
cialist economies of Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia com-
menced in earnest with the Party Congresses of 1986.24 In 
1988 Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan made a 
clarion call to "turn battlefields into marketplaces," with spe-
cific reference to opening up trade and cross-investment links 
between Thailand and its regional neighbours.25 A significant 
aspect of this Thai initiative was an interest in neighbouring 
countries' rich natural resource bases.26 The breakup of the 
Soviet bloc in 1989 put this regional economic reorientation on 
a global and permanent footing. In this context, the plans for 
the Mekong started to be taken seriously. 
The intervening period between the early Mekong plans and 
their resurrection in the Revised Indicative Plan had seen a 
considerable re-think on large dams and on environmental and 
human rights implications of large-scale development projects 
more generally.27 In the early 1990s, the Chief Executive of the 
Mekong Secretariat promoted the plans for large-scale im-
poundments with a vigour suggesting little recognition of such 
a change in thinking.28 As a result, the revised Mekong plans 
quickly attracted the attention of international environmen-
talists. Additionally, downstream countries' concern over the 
implications of large-scale upstream impoundments combined 
with traditional lack of trust between riparian countries to stall 
the reformulation of the Mekong Committee and the readmit-
tance of Cambodia.29 During this period, the Mekong Secre-
tariat revised the Mekong Cascade into a seemingly more pal-
atable "run-of-river" scheme, which would involve a similar 
24. See D.K. FORBES ET AL., VIETNAM'S RENOVATION POLICY AND PERFORMANCE 
(1991). 
25. See Marc Innes-Brown & Mark Valencia, Thailand's Resource Diplomacy in 
Indochina and Myanmar, 14 CONTEMPORARY SOUTH EAST ASIA 332 (1993). 
26. See id. 
27. See Mitchell, supra note 16. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
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number of dams to the previous plans but at reduced crest 
height and therefore with greatly reduced impoundments. 30 
III. TRANSBOUNDARY ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 
The Mekong River Basin includes parts of the territories of 
six countries: China, Burma, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia 
and Vietnam.3l Impoundments that impact on the river's hy-
drology and ecology have the potential to affect both water 
availability and environmental quality elsewhere in the basin, 
most notably in areas downstream. As a result, international 
political, social, economic, environmental and legal questions 
are raised by proposed hydropower projects. In recognition of 
this fact, there is a history of cooperative arrangements for 
management of the Mekong River and its tributaries. 32 
While most accounts of cooperative Mekong arrangements 
start with the establishment of the Mekong Committee, there 
is in fact a much longer history of treaties and agreements. 
Earlier agreements dealt mainly with questions of boundary 
demarcation. Siam's relationship with French colonial Indo-
china was governed in part by various commissions established 
to develop and oversee such agreements.33 
The Mekong Committee was established in 1957.34 The rai-
son d'etre for the 'Committee has broadly been seen as twofold. 
First, it has served as a focus for the mobilisation of interna-
tional resources to invest in the large structures involved in 
hydropower development.35 Second, it has provided an institu-
tional basis for resolution of issues of water sharing and other 
international aspects of natural resource management in this 
international river basin.36 Upstream and downstream inter-
ests can, in principle, be reconciled and negotiated more equi-
30. See MARK HILL & SUSAN HILL, FISHERIES ECOLOGY AND HYDROPOWER IN THE 
MEKONG RIVER: AN EVALUATION OF RUN OF THE RIVER PROJECTS (1994). 
31. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
32. See Kim Chi, supra note 21. 
33. See id. 
34. See MRC 1995, supra note 1. See also Mitchell, supra note 16. 
35. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
36. See id. 
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tably within this framework than without it. So long as hydro-
power development was viewed unequivocally in a positive 
light, these two roles and objectives were quite compatible. 
However, as large dams have been questioned and become in-
creasingly controversial, this dual role has raised important 
questions.37 Few have been properly addressed in the forma-
tion of the Mekong River Commission. 
In 1995, after several years of negotiation and bargaining 
among riparian countries, the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC) was established.38 The key event that marked the new 
institutional arrangement was the signing of the Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Me-
kong River Basin in Chiengrai on 5 April 1975. As was the 
case with the original Mekong Committee, the MRC does not 
include China and Burma. Unlike the earlier Committee, how-
ever, the MRC is open to membership by the upstream coun-
tries, and is a product of regional politics rather than global 
cold war interests. 
The Agreement is a fourteen-page document that dermes ri-
parian states' roles and responsibilities in quite loose terms. It 
is mainly concerned with questions of altered hydrological 
flows that would arise as a result of inter- and intra-basin di-
versions and of large storage dams. While the language of the 
document is couched in terms of sustainability, there are only 
quite vague guidelines and objectives within the document. 
The key substantive (as opposed to procedural) provisions are 
contained in Articles 5, 6 and 26. Article 5 sets criteria for re-
sponsibilities of riparian members for notification, prior consul-
tation or agreement among the Joint Committee of the MRC in 
case of inter- and intra-basin diversions from tributaries and 
the mainstream during the wet and dry seasons. Agreement is 
only required in the most extreme of cases, that of inter-basin 
diversion from the mainstream during the dry season. Even 
here there is scope for relying on prior consultation, in the 
event that there is a "surplus" of water available for all parties 
37. See id. 
38. See Kim Chi, supra note 21. 
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to the satisfaction of the Joint Committee. All tributary devel-
opment is only subject to notification.39 Article 6 deals with 
maintenance of minimum and maximum flows on the main-
stream,40 while Article 26 addresses questions of determining 
and measuring adequate flows.41 
A major limitation of the MRC is the absence of China and 
Burma. Both countries have had invitations to join, but to date 
the Commission remains limited to the four downstream coun-
tries. In the case of Burma, this may be largely due to the 
marginal role of that country in the Basin and the low basin-
wide significance of the small area of the country's Northeast 
that lies within the Basin.42 The case of China is more com-
plex. As an upstream country, particularly one that has al-
ready built one dam on the mainstream with no consultation 
with other riparian states and that has several more dams un-
der construction and in the pipeline, China has more to lose 
than gain from participation in a regime that restricts member 
states' power to act unilaterally. China's lack of interest is also 
due to that country's size and preference to deal bilaterally 
with its Southeast Asian neighbours.43 China's main interest 
in the Mekong international regime is in the area of naviga-
tion.44 There are environmentally controversial plans to dyna-
mite rapids in northw~stern Laos to allow larger boats safer 
passage between Yunnan Province and the Thai/Lao section of 
the Mekong. 
In a positive sense, therefore, the international legal regime 
for water sharing and cooperative decision making in the Me-
kong Basin provides for consultation and notification of plans 
by one or more countries that have implications in the territo-
ries of others. Going beyond interests of individual nation 
states in this way may help preempt the kind of conflict that is 
apparent elsewhere in world, for example in the Euphrates or 
39. MRC 1995, supra note 1, art. 5. 
40. Id. art. 6. 
41. Id. art. 26. 
42. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
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Jordan River Basins in the Middle East. Less positively, the 
interests negotiated within the framework of the MRC agree-
ment are mainly those of large-scale resource development 
agencies, notably energy and irrigation and to a lesser extent 
flood control. There has, thus, been a built-in bias within the 
MRC toward decisions favouring large-scale impoundments. 
There has been more recent attention to fisheries and envi-
ronment sections at the Mekong Secretariat by European' do-
nors in particular, but the Council and Joint Committee of the 
MRC are still comprised of energy and water resource minis-
ters and officials. 45 
IV. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
While the basis for cooperation within the MRC is nomi-
nally a regional one, comprising the four lower riparian na-
tions, a range of wider international influences bear on the de-
cisions and planning for large-scale hydropower development. 
Whereas the geopolitical strategic interests and interventions 
of the Cold War period have largely dissipated, a number of 
other agendas continue to shape regional developments. 
Broadly, these fall under the rubric of international develop-
ment assistance, international non-governmental organization 
(NGO) concerns, and corporate interests. 
International development agencies have taken a great in-
terest in the Mekong Region for a number of reasons. One is 
the disparity between levels of development, as conventionally 
measured, between the countries of Indochina (Lao PDR, Cam-
bodia and Vietnam) on the one hand, and rapidly growing 
economies such as Thailand on the other. There has been a 
shift of development assistance from Thailand to its eastern 
neighbours, which has been reinforced by the regional agenda 
of integration and cooperation that is part of the wider rap-
prochement discussed above. Vietnam and Lao PDR have 
joined the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
and there is a provisional opening for Cambodia to join as the 
last southeast Asian nation to do so. Multilateral interests in 
45. See id. 
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the region are dominated by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and its grand scheme for the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS).46 This plan to link the countries of the region through 
integrated energy grids, road networks, telecommunications 
and tourism has immense social and environmental implica-
tions.47 There is a specific environment program component in 
the ADB's GMS program. Other multilateral influences in-
clude the World Bank and its support for specific dams and 
other infrastructure projects. 48 Through the Global Environ-
ment Facility and other means, the World Bank also has spe-
cific environment-targeted programs. 49 Other multilateral 
agencies include the major United Nations organisations. A 
question that arises is the extent to which the development 
agenda is being set from within or without the region. 
Bilateral interests in the Mekong region are focused on a 
few key donor countries: Australia, Japan, France, Germany, 
Sweden and Denmark. Both Japan and Australia combine 
their development assistance roles with a sense of being re-
gional neighbours. In the cases of both Japan and Australia, 
there are strong commercial links to the aid program, directly 
through aid procurement and indirectly in the "showcasing" 
role of large projects. One such project is the Friendship 
Bridge which connects Thailand to Laos, completed in 1994 
which is also the first bridge across the Mekong mainstream. 50 
The bridge was supported by the Australian Government as 
part of its bilateral aid programs to Thailand and Lao PDR. 51 
Somewhat in contraposition to the international govern-
mental influence on Mekong development brought by bilateral 
and multilateral development assistance is the role of interna-
tional NGOs. Several NGOs have been strong in their critique 
46. See Fiologo Pante, Asian Development Bank's Regional Technical Assistance 
for Promoting Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion, in DEVELOPING 
THE MEKONG 204, 204·210 (Bob Stensholt ed. 1997). 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, QUARTERLY OPERATIONAL REPORT 
(World Bank, April 1996). 
50. See M. Stuart-Fox, Laos in 1997: Into ASEAN, 38 ASIAN SURVEY 75-79 (1998). 
51. See id. 
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of the renewed push for large-scale hydropower development. 
Internationally, the International Rivers Network and Probe 
International, based in the United States and Canada respec-
tively, have paid particular attention to the Mekong. 52 Region-
ally, the Bangkok based group TERRA has developed out of 
Thailand's concern over the impacts of development on its own 
environment and, more recently, concern among some envi-
ronmentalists in Thailand that, partly as a result of their suc-
cess, the ·resource development agenda was being exported be-
yond Thailand's borders in order to serve that country's energy, 
timber and other resource needs. It is significant that TERRA 
is the sister organisation of the Project for Ecological Recovery, 
a livelihood-focused environmental NGO that has played a sig-
nificant part in campaigns over large dams in Thailand. 53 
However, other NGOs have played a more ambiguous role in 
the hydropower debate. For example, CARE International has 
served as a consultant in resettlement schemes for proposed 
large dams in Lao PDR. Much of the public debate, acrimony 
and influence in the Lao dams issue, thus, takes place on the 
international scene and, even within Lao borders, among expa-
triate individuals and organisations. 54 
Resource development is internationalised increasingly 
within an agenda of privatisation and international corporate 
interest in the region's resource base. Nowhere has this been 
more apparent and controversial than in the hydropower sec-
tor.55 Numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) have 
been signed between consortia of companies from Thailand, 
Australia, Japan, the United States and several European 
countries for the construction of dams on Mekong tributaries. 56 
Most of these are concentrated in Lao PDR, but there are also 
52. See Rivers in Peril <www.im.org/programs/mekong/mekong.html>; See also 
The Mekong Program <www.nextcity.comlProbeIntemationaVMekonglindex .html>. 
53. See Philip Hirsch & Larry Lohmann, The Contemporary Politics of Environ-
ment in Thailand, 29 ASIAN SURVEY 439 (1989). 
54. See Philip Hirsch, Who Controls the Mekong Development Agenda? Presenta-
tion at Mekong Perspectives Conference, Feb. 22-23, 1999 (Australian National Uni-
versity 1999). 
55. See Saturo Matsumoto, Development and Environment in Press: A North 
South Perspective on the Representation of Mekong Hydropower Developments (1999) 
(unpublished Masters thesis, University of Sydney) (on file with author). 
56. See id. 
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many sites of interest to such companies in Vietnam and Cam-
bodia. Privatisation of the resource base57 occurs mainly 
through one variant or another of the Build Own Operate 
Transfer (BOOT) financing model. 58 This has also been termed 
a "rent-a-river" approach. 59 Many of the corporate interests 
have historical links in public agencies whose engineers previ-
ously constructed dams in Australia, Europe and North Amer-
ica and which no longer have opportunities to build further 
structures in those countries.60 BOOT schemes raise issues of 
sovereignty at several levels. Sovereignty over resources and 
open space is transferred from public to private arenas, albeit 
for a limited period (typically 25 to 30 years). Sovereignty is-
sues also transcend national boundaries, as international cor-
porate interests achieve concessions and resource rights over 
public assets and over nature itself. Little studied, but in-
creasingly urgent in the Mekong hydropower context, is the 
issue of privatised natural resource development for social and 
environmental decision making. Commercial-in-confidence 
criteria conflict with issues of openness and flexibility in natu-
ral resource planning that has human rights, local livelihood 
and ecological implications. 
Increasingly, the public-corporate dichotomy is broken down 
as privatised hydropower schemes are promoted "in the public 
interest." Where the more powerful and influential decision 
makers are global corporations or consortia and their associ-
ated institutional financial backers, which wield more economic 
clout than the countries with whom "partnerships" are being 
negotiated, local public interest issues and agenda-setting are 
57. See PRIV ATISING NATURE: POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR THE GLOBAL COMMONS, 
(Michael Goldman ed., 1998). 
58. For further information on BOOT in the Mekong Region, see Andrew B. Wyatt, 
BOOT in the Mekong Region: Environmental Management and Development Chal-
lenges, paper presented at the conference, BOOT: In the PublIC Interest? (March 21, 
1998) (transcript available in The Online Journalist 
<http://138.25.138.94/acijlbootlspeakers.html>. 
59. See Ann Danaiya Usher, The &ce for Power in Laos: The Nordic Connections 
in Environmental Change, in SOUTH-EAST ASIA: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (Michael Parnwell & Raymond Bryant eds., 1996). 
60. See AlDIWATCH, Australian Dam Pushers Doing Business in Laos (1998) 
(briefing paper). 
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distorted. This raises important questions of national interest 
in the natural resource base. 
V. ISSUES OF NATIONAL INTEREST 
"National interest" is integral to the discourse of hydro-
power development. This is in part due to the particular char-
acteristics of large dams, whose primary social and environ-
mental effects are localised but dramatic and whose wider 
benefits normally accrue elsewhere, often at considerable dis-
tance and to more politically, economically and culturally 
dominant groups. 61 Such issues are complicated when the im-
pacts of projects transcend national borders, and even more so 
as benefits in the form of electricity generated accrue to con-
sumers in neighbouring countries, while profits from the in-
vestment flow to third countries' investors. Compensation is 
taken outside the arena, of national calculation of local versus 
wider public goods. 62 Similarly, avenues of redress for affected 
communities become more complex and tortuous. Issues arise 
as to whether environmental regulations in the investors' home 
countries, regulations in the country in which the project is 
being constructed, or regulations of international institutions 
such as the World Bank should serve as referents. 
The discourse of national interest has long been part of hy-
dropower development. The Tennessee Valley Authority in the 
United States and the Snowy River scheme in Australia served 
as national answers to economic depression and post-war re-
covery. Nehru described dams as the "new temples of India."63 
The symbolism of large-scale hydropower is bound up with na-
tional pride. Interestingly, international actors have bought 
into this rhetoric. Australian, Thai, French and other firms 
with MOUs to build dams in Lao PDR for export of electricity 
to Thailand all invoke Laos' national interest. For the past 
61. See Matsumoto, supra note 55. 
62. See Philip Hirsch, Dams and Compensation in Indochina, in RESOURCES, 
NATIONS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: CASE STUDIES FROM AUSTRALIA, ME:LANESIA AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Richard Howitt et al. eds., 1993). 
63. See PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF 
LARGE DAMS (996). 
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several years, there has hardly been an issue of the Vientiane 
Times that has not extolled the rosy future to be brought by 
hydropower as a solution to the country's shortage of foreign 
exchange and low income status. 
An important theme in this discourse is the idea of local 
sacrifice for a wider good. Those who object to large-scale dams 
are characterised as parochial, or in cohort with foreign inter-
ests trying to limit national development prowess, or even as a 
threat to national security. Thailand has both the greatest ex-
perience with large dams in the region and the most vocal op-
positional environment movement, part of which is intimately 
connected with human rights and livelihood issues. 64 In Lao 
PDR and Vietnam, the rhetoric of national interest is closely 
bound up with those countries' revolutionary nationalist expe-
rience. To threaten national interest is to question the Party 
and vice versa. Limited spaces for questioning national policy 
in the public arena in these countries has left a large part of 
the discourse to international environmental and other NGOs, 
which has a reinforcing effect of portraying any questioning of 
hydropower as foreign-inspired. 
Despite the nationalist rhetoric behind dams, there are 
clearly divergent interests within the Mekong Region's national 
boundaries, just as there are convergent interests that tran-
scend borders. Differences at a national level are based on 
geographical, social, environmental, ideological, economic and 
cultural interests. 65 While it is beyond the scope of this article 
to detail the geography and sociology of the costs and benefits 
of individual hydropower projects, the environmental implica-
tions of large schemes are intimately bound up with livelihood 
impacts on the majority of the rural populations who continue 
to have a direct dependence on the natural resource base for 
food, shelter, and income. 
64. See SEEING FORESTS FOR TREES: ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN 
THAILAND (Philip Hirsch ed., 1997); THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA: RESOURCES AND RESISTANCE (Philip Hirsch & Carol Warren eds., 1998). 
65. See HIRSCH & CHEONG, supra note 3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Large dams and their impacts have become a feature of 
heated controversy in many countries. Many of the means to 
deal with such conflict are based on the idea that various inter-
ests exist and need to be worked out within the geographical, 
political and legal constraints of nation states. Yet, as this ar-
ticle has shown with reference to the Mekong Basin, there are 
many environmental and resource questions that cannot easily 
be resolved within such a framework. Impacts themselves 
cross national borders. Influences promoting or critiquing a 
development model that has hydropower at its core come from 
well beyond the national borders within which a particular 
dam is proposed to be built. Financing mechanisms and con-
sortia responsible for dam construction are global in nature. _ 
The environmental discourses that surround large dams oper-
ate at many different scales. Any legal framework developed to 
govern issues of sovereignty, redress, environmental regula-
tion, fmancing arrangements and a host of other questions as-
sociated with large dams needs to go well beyond the limited 
arena of national law. 
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